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A bule1 voting for the Christian contender competing 
against a Muslim candidate might seem predictable 
enough. But that, combined with the summer’s in-
creasingly heated protests against the US support of  
Israel’s military aggression towards Palestine, made my 
image likely to have shades of meaning that went well 
beyond that of a simple spectator.  Would they recog-
nize that I was voting for Dirly because he was the 
hometown hero, not just because of a perceived auto-
matic affinity for the Christian and “Western-facing” 
characteristics that are often attributed to the ethnic 
Minahasans?2  I tried to sink into my chair in front of 
the movie screen set up in the mayor’s office at Manado 
city center, a little relieved that we were at a rally for 
the crowning of the 2006 winner of Indonesian Idol, 
and not at a rally for a political candidate. 
The Indonesian Idol competition that summer was a 
beautiful expression of the complex nexus of issues 
that exist in the Minahasan region of North Sulawesi 
regarding religion,  ethnicity,  nationalism and the in-
fluence of a unique colonial history. The summer’s Idol 
competition had culminated in a deadlock between 
Dirly, the local Manado boy raised on gospel tunes, 
and Ihsan, a Muslim from Medan who favored cheeky 
performances of traditional religious tunes from his 
region in North Sumatra. Both sufficiently cute to hold 
the attention of young girls  across the nation, and with 
enough vocal talent to handle everything from rock 
songs to Bollywood-esque ballads, the final competi-
tion morphed into something that wasn’t just about 
whose dance moves were better. There were bigger 
issues at stake: loyalties to religion and region, and the 
place of minority religious or ethnic constituents vis-à-
vis the Muslim majority.  And these were being beamed 
out across the country from what had become, in es-
sence, a national stage. 
Back in Manado, things seemed much simpler on the 
surface. I was certain, as were my neighbors in the row 
behind me,  that everyone in the crowd now numbering 
over three or four hundred that was gathered at the 
mayor’s office to watch the Idol competition would be 
voting for Dirly, whether they were Christian or Mus-
lim. During a commercial break, Mayor Jimmi Rogi 
made an announcement: the mayor’s  office would be 
handing out Simpati cell phone cards to everyone in 
the audience, so they could be sure and have enough 
minutes on their hand phones to call in a vote. Every 
single vote was important, we all understood, since we 
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might have been the only ones voting for Dirly, pitted 
against the weight of a country full of people who might 
be more inclined to ‘vote Muslim,’  even if they were 
from neighboring regions on the Eastern side of the 
archipelago. Certainly our numbers were puny com-
pared to the voting power of Java alone, and Dirly was 
an underdog despite his good looks and the faith local 
women had in his superior training singing in front of 
the pulpit with GMIM (Evangelical Church of Mina-
hasa) youth choirs. One thing was certain:  this  was a 
time when loyalty to a regional ethnic identity should 
trump loyalty to religious affiliations, as  Mayor Rogi 
reminded the audience with the self-proclaimed re-
gional slogan “Torang Samua Basudara” as he stood 
on the stage waving a handful of Simpati cards. 
Torang Samua Basudara. We are all brothers. The 
words were splashed across the worn banners that fes-
tooned streets in the city center, and framed the ubiq-
uitous answer to any questions about religious rela-
tions or the relative peace of Manado compared with 
other cities  in Sulawesi,  such as Poso to the south, that 
were infamous for incidents of ‘religious’ violence. 
What had begun as an interpretation of  Christian ide-
ology introduced by Dutch missionaries  in their pro-
ject to unite eight disparate regional tribes into a co-
herent and governable whole was transformed into an 
important aspect of  local ethnic character that suc-
ceeded in joining together the different peoples of 
North Sulawesi.3 People rarely cited the predominance 
of Christians in number and political power as the key 
to avoiding the violent instability of other regions 
where there is an even division of Christians and Mus-
lims.  Minahasans relied instead on the mantra of ethnic 
solidarity and a joint commitment to protecting the 
Minahasan homeland, in order to explain the relative 
peace of the region. This was something that was just 
as salient for the local Muslims I spoke with as  local 
Christians.  Families from both religious backgrounds, 
as well as  local officials, were quick to mention the 
work of BKSAUA (Bekerja Sama Antara Umat 
Agama, the Association for Cooperation between Re-
ligious Communities), an organization formed in 1969 
to foster inter-religious dialogue and cooperation of 
“all of the religions allowed by the government,” mean-
ing the five religious traditions codified in the national 
ideology of Pancasila:  Islam,  Catholicism, Christianity, 
Hinduism and Buddhism. The most visible manifesta-
tion of their work was the installation of local church 
leaders outside area mosques during holidays  and 
other religious events; Muslim elders performed the 
same function during Christian celebrations. People 
claimed that this deterred any type of mob violence or 
retaliatory acts like those that occurred in other parts 
of Sulawesi or Ambon, since these local leaders were 
an embodiment of the united ethnic front that was es-
sential and special to the region. Their efforts only 
reinforced the feelings that ensured Manado and the 
surrounding areas were not plagued by inter-religious 
confrontations. 
Manado seemed to embody perfection at the institu-
tional level when it came to religious harmony. Official 
meetings began with the predictable Muslim greeting 
Salam but then veered into oddity with the addition of 
Shalom,  a reference to relations local Christians feel 
with the holy land of Israel. The long-winded introduc-
tions and opening speeches found at any acara resmi 
(official ceremony) were closed with Muslim and Chris-
tian prayers, and no one seemed to find this in the least 
bit incongruous. At the summer’s birthday celebration 
for Manado city, the wives of local officials stood re-
splendent in their matching yellow and white kebayas4 
with the coconut tree regional crest, the only markers 
of religious identity being the occasional color-
coordinated jilbab.5  During a tour of  a local primary 
school, the principal extolled the virtues of the school’s 
religious education program and how it went above and 
beyond what was required by the Indonesian state cur-
ricula. This curriculum was meant to promote religious 
harmony and education in cross-religious history.  A 
few afternoons a week, students were sent out into the 
community to attend religious seminars to learn about 
religious traditions and ceremonies different than their 
own. But it wasn’t until the end of  the afternoon that 
someone thought to ask where the children were given 
instruction in religions other than their own. It became 
clear that the children were not exposed to alternative 
religious ceremonies at all. The principal was dismis-
sive of our suspicions about the reality of cross-
religious education, being that they were never given 
the opportunity to visit the other religion’s place of 
worship. How would the mystery surrounding what the 
student sitting next to them did on those afternoons 
outside the classroom be dispelled if they had never 
witnessed it? What would happen if there was a mixed-
religion family? The absurdity of this question was 
communicated by the principle’s raised eyebrows.  
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Although the choice of religious tradition was a stu-
dent’s, the principal assured us that once it was chosen 
there was no question of conversion or even reconsid-
eration. This made religious identity seem just as im-
mutable as a regional one. 
Principles of balance between Islam and Christianity 
were not only the domain of institutional practices, but 
were part of the everyday praxis that constituted local 
life and local aspirations. When I pressed a friend to 
elaborate on her hedged admission that there was some 
metaphysical force afoot in the region that maintained 
its peaceful demeanor, she explained that the sincere 
and sustained prayers of local residents were the secret 
currency that had bought North Sulawesi  years of calm 
and prosperity. I was caught off-guard by her indignant 
“of course!” when I asked if Muslim prayers contrib-
uted to this force-field generated by the faithful. I 
thought about a number of Saturday visits made to 
Bukit Kasih, “The Hill of Love,” where Muslim and 
Christian families gathered to picnic in the shadow of 
giant statues of Lumimu’ut and Toar,  the mythical 
progenitors of the Minahasan people, and then run 
breathless up the mountainside to Minahasa’s version 
of Taman Mini,6  complete with a miniature Catholic 
church, miniature mosque, and miniature Buddhist 
temple. And about how the dawn hour outside my win-
dow was heralded by the Muslim call to prayer colliding 
with (friendly?) competition from a nearby church 
broadcasting the names of their faithful congregants 
over a loudspeaker. Perhaps I shouldn’t have been so 
surprised that Muslim and Christian prayers were 
joined in people’s minds just as the sounds of worship 
mingled on the streets. 
But the ideology of ethnic solidarity didn’t entirely 
obliterate the tensions of religious relations, and the 
very different trajectories of Islamic versus Christian 
global politics sometimes forced the theme of regional 
brotherhood to take on strange permutations, as peo-
ple tried to reconcile aspects of global religious narra-
tives with the local.  During a late night conversation, a 
retired Christian teacher began to conspiratorially 
whisper theories about the recent natural disasters on 
the Western side of the archipelago, insinuating that 
until Muslims on that side of the country recognized 
Jesus Christ as their savior, their luck would never get 
better. I reminded him that an hour earlier he had given 
a long and impassioned speech about the unity of all 
people in the eyes of God, and therefore his theory 
couldn’t possibly be true.  However that didn’t deter 
him. “But ah” he said, leaning closer “then I was talk-
ing about people here, in Minahasa. You see, the Mus-
lims here are different.  They’re like us.” People often 
said things that situated them in reference to global 
religious narratives that seemed contradictory, in my 
opinion, to the principles of ethnic brotherhood in 
Minahasa. 
For example, one of the narratives most discordant 
with ideas of ethnic brotherhood was related to the way 
Minahasan Christians imagined their place in a global 
story of Christianity.  This narrative centered on the 
relationship local Christians feel they share with Israel, 
Like it does for many other Christians worldwide, the 
holy land of Israel represents a touchstone of Christian 
faith, and local Christians often referred to Manado as 
Israel kedua, or the “second Israel,” instantiating 
North Sulawesi  as centrally located in a global Chris-
tian tradition. The affirmation of my American identity 
to someone on the streets of  Manado often received a 
rousing reply of “Go Israel!” because local interpreta-
tions saw George Bush and Americans as protectors of 
Israel, and Christianity,  in the field of global politics. 
How such Christian (and tacitly anti-Islamic) imaginar-
ies fit with ideologies of ethnic brotherhood was some-
times difficult to for me to conceive. At times it seemed 
like the insistence on Manado as  the “second Israel” 
was never stretched to its “logical” conclusion,  one 
where it made a statement about the Christians in 
Manado versus their Muslim neighbors. However, it’s 
likely that I misapprehended how linkages to global 
religious narratives might have little in common with 
local religious relations in the minds of Minahasans. 
This was evident even in the ways in which local follow-
ers of Islam also focused on a positive relationship with 
the West and specifically the United States, asserting 
those characteristics that linked ethnic Minahasans in a 
common bond, including their “forward” or “West-
ern” facing personalities, regardless of the fact that 
they were often opposed to America’s support of Is-
raeli aggression against Palestine. When I asked peo-
ple to explicitly address the differences between Chris-
tians and Muslims in Minahasa, they often countered 
with responses that linked the religious traditions – 
monotheism and shared religious texts: Moses and 
Abraham. These encounters contextualized experi-
ences I had conducting fieldwork in Indonesian Chris-
tian churches in the United States, where the congre-
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gations I worked with were predominantly from North 
Sulawesi.  People had often quietly informed me that 
there were a number of Minahasan Muslims who regu-
larly attended church activities. When I asked one of 
the pastors to explain their presence, she had replied 
simply: “They feel like they are a part of us. And we 
welcome them.” Perhaps the idea that people’s orien-
tation to global political/religious narratives necessar-
ily dictates the logic of  everyday interaction on an inti-
mate local level was one that referenced my own West-
ern bias more than it exposed some sort of incongruity 
in Minahasan ideologies. 
However, application of the ideal of ethnic brother-
hood did not always have positive effects at level of  
local politics, especially for those perceived to be “out-
siders” to the region. Perhaps most illustrative of this 
was an incident that occurred in a local street market 
known as Paal Dua. Located near the waterfront,  be-
hind Manado’s very suburban main street called the 
Boulevard, Paal Dua is more of a typical pasar than the 
nearby Boulevard Mall complex, with crowded streets 
and labyrinthine paths weaving in and out of small,  
individually run booths selling everything from bootleg 
CDs to fruits and vegetables. Loud and chaotic, Paal 
Dua, which is serviced by the local blue public trans-
port buses called mikrolets,  is filled with people soon 
after sunset and well into the night. It’s everything the 
Boulevard, with its clean new buildings and Western 
restaurants like A&W Root Beer and Pizza Hut, is not. 
The market made a good night spot for anyone out to 
saunter or people watch or to pick up a few oleh-oleh 
(souvenirs) to send home. However, after class one 
afternoon our program head announced that we should 
avoid the area until further notice since there had been 
“riots” earlier in the day, making it unsafe. We 
couldn’t seem to get any information about the riots 
other than the fact that a rock lobbed by one of  street 
merchants in the area had sparked an unaccustomed 
moment of violence, that the police had been involved, 
and that the market was closed until further notice. It 
took a day or two in which to sort out why a small inci-
dent had swiftly metamorphosed into something with 
such disturbing undertones. Our tutors and other 
mentors seemed hesitant to discuss the underlying 
causes, and as non-native speakers we had trouble de-
ciphering the commentaries and rumors swirling about 
the event. 
The story we slowly pieced together was one that 
pitted city officials against the merchants  at Paal Dua. 
The city of Manado had recently introduced a goal to 
become the self proclaimed “Tourist City of the 
World,” and the need to be an attractive destination for 
Europeans and Westerners led to the city’s  desire to 
“clean up” the area. Paal Dua  was one of the first tar-
gets in removing all traces of the street economy away 
from what was to be a budding new center of tourism. 
When police threatened that they would begin to 
forcibly disassemble the plywood coverings that made 
the merchant’s mobile carts into a ramshackle perma-
nent structure, a rock was thrown in frustration. That 
was enough of a motivation for the police to clear the 
area by force. 
Something seemed awry with the city’s willingness to 
take such drastic measures to eradicate this street mar-
ket and ignite a controversy that would last well 
through the summer’s end. Who were these mer-
chants, commonly known as pedagang kaki lima 
(PKL), who the local government had no qualms about 
violently and publicly relocating and who inspired little 
sympathy among the city’s inhabitants? The situation 
was disconcerting when juxtaposed against the focus 
on regional harmony, hospitality and neighborliness 
that was evident in so many other aspects of life in 
Manado. 
The real problem with this particular group of PKL 
was not that their mobile carts had mushroomed into 
an eyesore, although that didn’t help their case.  In-
stead, it seemed that people’s underlying disdain for 
the situation at Paal Dua stemmed from the fact that 
most of these merchants were itinerants from the newly 
reconfigured propinsi Gorontalo,7  a predominantly 
Muslim center about a 12 -hour drive to the south. The 
Gorontalese were outsiders twice over, hailing from 
another region that was no longer even peripherally 
connected to Minahasan political affairs and outside 
overt political control. This  was  certainly a factor in 
local official’s decision to take such decisive and ag-
gressive action to clear the marketplace. Their actions 
exacerbated a tense situation but media coverage and 
nationwide scrutiny caused the local government to 
adopt a much more conciliatory tone in their dealings 
with the group. 
These events were not, as it might easily be assumed, 
just the machinations of a Christian dominated local 
government trying to quietly run a group of Muslim 
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merchants out of town. What people invoked over and 
over when I questioned them directly about the their 
approval of relocating the PKL from Paal Dua was a 
sense of  the danger emanating from regional outsiders, 
people who didn’t know or respect the covenant that 
Minahasans, both Christians and Muslims alike, had to 
protect and promote the peace in their homeland. How 
could these men, who came from a region that wasn’t 
populated by streets where mosques and churches 
coexist peacefully side by side, be trusted to maintain 
what Minahasans worked and prayed so hard to pro-
tect? Would they understand the affinity many Mina-
hasans feel with Westerners and extend that special 
sort of  hospitality to the droves of tourists that locals 
were anxiously hoping would arrive? What was at 
stake, as far as local residents were concerned, was if 
the PKL could really be trusted to understand some-
thing they believed was essential to Minahasan life, and 
was worth protecting. 
These issues touched on questions of faith, some-
thing I heard a lot about during my stay in Manado. Not 
faith as it applied exclusively to any one religious tradi-
tion, but a perseverance of belief in the principle of 
ethnic brotherhood, an unshakable conviction that 
dedication to this principle would (and does) see it 
realized.  Like any true faith, it is partially blind and 
certainly naïve, overlooking everything from the little 
inconsistencies to the glaring omissions that it encom-
passes. I encountered just as many contrary examples 
to the slogan Torang Samua Basudara as I did com-
plimentary ones,  making it difficult at times to under-
stand how they all existed in the same universe.  But as 
we sat in the mayor’s office that night, Muslim, Chris-
tian and Westerner alike rooting for Dirly against the 
odds, I could see that despite its sometimes overly op-
timistic cast on local relations, I could not discount the 
belief that people shared in the intangible ideal of Mi-
nahasan brotherhood. At least in that respect we were 
essentially all the same. 
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1 Bule is common Indonesian slang that refers to a white for-
eigner.  
2 Minahasa is an ethnic term describing people who live in the 
region of North Sulawesi, the fifth and smallest province in 
Sulawesi.  Minahasa also refers to a political geographical 
designation that is used to describe the areas of Bitung, Manado 
and Minahasa regency, three of the five administrative units in 
North Sulawesi Province. Manado is the capital city of North 
Sulawesi province.  A number of languages are spoken in the 
region including Indonesian, a Malay based creole called 
Manado Malay or Bahasa Manado, Tountemboan, Toulor, 
Tonsea and Tombulu.  Although people may refer to village or 
sub regional identities, most people identify themselves as part 
of the suku Minahasa (Minahasan ethnic group).  
3 The word Minahasa itself first appeared in VOC communiqué 
1789 referring to a meeting of walak or regional tribal heads in 
the area of North Sulawesi controlled by the Dutch, according 
to historian David Henley.  Henley also notes that Dutch mis-
sionaries promoted the idea of a unified regional ethnic identity 
in order to unite the eight disparate tribes in the area under 
Dutch control into a single unit.  In Henley, D.  1993.  National-
ism and Regionalism in Colonial Indonesia: the case of  Mina-
hasa,  Indonesia 55:91-112. 
4 Local traditional dress for women 
5 Indonesian term for the head covering worn by Muslim 
women 
6 Taman Mini Indonesian Indah (Beautiful Indonesia in Minia-
ture) a theme park in Jakarta that has miniature replicas of 
regional ethnic structures from all over the Indonesian archipel-
ago 
7 Gorontalo seceded from the North Sulawesi province and 
became its own province in December of 2000.  
